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TIMELY INTERVENTIONS: MACKINNON'S
CONTRIBUTION TO CANADIAN EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE

Sheila McIntyre*
I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for inviting me to discuss
Professor Catharine MacKinnon's contributions to Canadian law and feminist legal
activism. I have focused on her contributions to equality jurisprudence and to law
reforms related to sexual-assault law. This focus only captures some of the most direct of
her contributions to Canadian equality thinking and activism during the last twenty-five
years. Professor MacKinnon's work is taught in an astonishingly varied range of law
school courses and social science subjects across Canada. It is regularly cited in legal
briefs and scholarship devoted to equality and human rights law, theory, and advocacy
and to combating male violence against women. In researching this paper, I re-read some
of the writings that have been very important to me in my life as a legal scholar and
feminist legal activist and read others for the first time. The ideas, the analysis, and the
writing are elegant, breathtaking, compelling, deeply challenging, and ground shifting sentence after sentence, page after page, topic after topic. I read passages out loud to my
partner. I ticked passages I wished to return to until I realized there were too many to
count. Sadly, at least in Canada, this kind of densely packed, formidably researched, and
original scholarship is a rarity in the new entrepreneurial academy dependent on publicprivate research partnerships and on market-focused learning and teaching. And its
uncompromising and demanding radicalism was always and remains a rarity in the
academy, in legal practice, and in feminist legal circles. So, again, I wish to say how
pleased I am to join in this tribute to a remarkable scholar and activist.
Part I of this article locates Professor MacKinnon's contributions to Canadian law
in their historic context. I hope this contextual framing dovetails with Professor Baer's
contribution to this symposium and suggests the domestic conditions that facilitated
adoption of MacKinnon's equality theory in a foreign jurisdiction. 1 In part II, I discuss
her general impact on Canadian equality advocacy methodologically and substantively.
Finally, part III highlights some of the key cases which are indebted not just to her
dominance theory but to her construction and expression of the legal issues in dispute. I
also offer two instances of how Canadian feminists adapted her analysis and method to
secure significant legislative reforms to criminal sexual-assault law and procedure.

* Law and Social Justice Professor, University of Ottawa.
1. See Susanne Baer, Traveling Concepts; Substantive Equality on the Road, 46
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PART I: LOCATING MACKINNON'S CONTRIBUTION INITS CONTEXT

Canada has two Constitution Acts. The first, enacted by England in 1867,2 ended
Canada's status as a British colony. It codified the procedural rules and powers of our
bicameral parliamentary system and an exhaustive division of federal and provincial
legislative powers, including over the appointment and jurisdiction of federal and
provincial judges. 3 It contained no bill of civil or human rights. Although scattered
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada attempted to find fundamental rights such as
freedom of speech, religion, and assembly implicit in the preamble to the 1867
5
Constitution Act, 4 no majority of the Court ever endorsed such an implied bill of rights.
Support for legally enforceable human rights in the wake of World War II initially
led to the adoption by most of the ten provinces of antidiscrimination statutes prohibiting
discrimination in access to public services, housing, and employment.6 In 1960, the
federal government enacted a statutory bill of rights containing fundamental freedoms,
due process rights, and a guarantee of "equality before the law and the protection of the
law," all of which rights the Bill declared "have existed and shall continue to exist
7
without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex."
Because it was an ordinary statute with no clear enforcement clause, the courts read it
very narrowly with excessive deference to Parliament. Between 1960, when the Bill
was enacted, and 1982, only one federal law was held inoperative under the Bill. 9 The
equality and antidiscrimination guarantees were read especially narrowly by the courts to
provide no more than a very narrow grant of formal equality that guaranteed only that
every federal law should be neutrally administered in respect of all individuals to whom
it applied.10 The Court further narrowed the antidiscrimination clause to prohibit only
differentiation in assignment of penalties such as fines or imprisonment, and not
differential allocation of state benefits on grounds prohibited by section one. Hence, in

2. All subsequent amendments of the 1867 Act had to be enacted in Britain.
3. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
4. See, e.g., Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (Can.) (invalidating ban on use of property for
propagation of communism); Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] S.C.R. 299-300 (Can.) (invalidating
persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses through municipal antileafleting by-laws); Re Alberta Statutes, [1938]
S.C.R. 100, 134-35 (Can.) (invalidating provincial interference with freedom of the press).'
5. Att'y Gen. Can. & Dupond v. Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 (Can.) (no implied bill of rights within the
Constitution prevents limitations of fundamental freedoms by competent legislation).
6. For a history of the enactment of such legislation, see WALTER TARNOPOLSKY, DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW IN CANADA 25-37 (1982).

7. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
8. See Curr v. R., [1972] S.C.R. 889, 899 (Can.) ("[C]ompelling reasons ought to be advanced to justify
the Court in this case to employ a statutory (as contrasted with a constitutional) jurisdiction to deny operative
effect to a substantive measure duly enacted by a Parliament constitutionally competent to do so, and
exercising its powers in accordance with the tenets of responsible government.").
9. Peter Hogg, A Comparison of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms with the CanadianBill of
Rights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 2, 21 (Walter Tamopolsky & Gerald Beaudoin

eds., 1982) [hereinafter Tamopolsky & Beaudoin, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS].
10. See Att'y Gen. Can. v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 1365 (Can.). Walter Tarnopolsky persuasively
argues that this narrow reading of equality before the law in section 1(b) amounts to a misreading of the
scholarship of A.V. Dicey and a failure to give content to the antidiscrimination guarantee in section 1. See
Walter Tarnopolsky, The Equality Rights, in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS, supra note 9, at 395, 410-11.
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Bliss v. Attorney Generalof Canada," the Court rejected a sex-discrimination challenge
to provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act that prevented women who had not
worked sufficiently long to be eligible for insured pregnancy and childbirth leave from
claiming regular benefits for post-pregnancy unemployment for which they would have
been eligible but for the fact that their unemployment was preceded by pregnancy.
Justice Roland Ritchie for the Supreme Court of Canada reasoned: "These provisions
form an integral part of a legislative scheme enacted for valid federal objectives and they
are concerned with conditions from which men are excluded. Any inequality between the
sexes in this area is not created by legislation but by nature"l 2
Finally, the Court held that the guarantee of "equality before the law and the
protection of the law" did not require universality of application of all laws. Differential
distribution of benefits and burdens by Parliament was permissible so long as the
legislation served a "valid federal objective."l 3 By "valid," the Court meant no more
than that laws must fall within federal constitutional competence and be "rationally
based and acceptable as . .. necessary . . . to meet special conditions and to attain a

necessary and desirable social objective." 14 In the result, only laws proved by the
challenger to be "arbitrary or capricious" or "based upon any ulterior motive or motives
offensive to the provisions" of the Bill would be found inconsistent with the equality
guarantees.1 5 The burden of proving that a federal objective was invalid lay on the
challenger. Not surprisingly, this onus was virtually impossible to meet. Most statutes
have a rationale; few are arbitrary or capricious in origin, and legislative intent - even if
benign - is notoriously hard to identify. Requiring the challenger to prove malign intent
doomed the guarantee.
Beginning in the 1970s, the national liberal government began to press for
"patriation" of the Canadian Constitution by securing amendments that would end the
last legal vestiges of Canada's colonial status - the requirement that all amendments to
the Constitution must be formally approved by the British Parliament. As part of this
modern overhaul, the liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, sought a package of
amendments altering resource sharing among the provinces and federal government and
adding an entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Constitution. The Charter
was intended to serve two political purposes.16 The specific goal was entrenchment of
minority language rights to Anglophones in Qu6bec and to Francophones in the other
nine, predominantly English, provinces 1 7 in the hope of dampening separatist aspirations
in Qudbec. Relatedly, the Charter was intended to shore up national unity around the

11. Bliss v. Att'y Gen. Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (Can.).
12. Id. at 190.
13. R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693, 708 (Can.).
14. McKay v. The Queen [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370, 406 (Can.).
15. Id at 407.
16. See Peter Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61
CANADIAN B. REv. 30 (1983). For the broader socio-political context of the press for an entrenched bill of
rights, see ALAN CAIRNS, CHARTER VERSUS FEDERALISM: THE DILEMMAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

(1992).
17. The province of New Brunswick is officially a bilingual province. Gov't of New Brunswick, About New
Brunswick - Basic Facts, Gov'T N.B., http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/-gateways/about-nb/basic_
facts.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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embrace and promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms shared by all Canadians
regardless of their language, religion, national origin, or geographic location. Efforts to
secure provincial agreement to this major constitutional reform were unsuccessful
through the 1970s,18 and by late 1980 the federal government determined to go straight
to Westminster with the federal proposals without provincial support. Concurrently, the
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution
held lengthy public hearings on the draft Charter of Rights in the hope of enlisting public
support for the new guarantees against the holdout provinces.19 Entrenchment was
deeply contentious for a variety of reasons: provinces feared that federally appointed
judges applying a national document would interfere with regional rights;20 the Left
feared that an unaccountable and unrepresentative judiciary would strike down
progressive laws and erode democratic process; the Right feared that special interest
groups would seek from courts what they could not secure by majoritarian democratic
means.
The continuing and widespread public debates about whether to entrench a
constitutional Charter of Rights and about its proposed content occurred at an auspicious
time for Canadian women. By 1980, a critical mass of feminists existed in law schools,
government offices, legal practice, and public advocacy groups. The Federal Canadian
Advisory Council on the Status of Women ("CACSW") commissioned research to
analyze Canadian precedent in order to participate in the popular debate and public
hearings and to ensure women's rights were adequately protected in any amended
constitutional document. 2 1 Feminist legal scholars also closely analyzed American
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and international human rights instruments to the
same end.22 Virtually all equality-seeking groups involved in the Charter hearings agreed

18.

See, e.g., AND NO ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT (Keith

Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1983); The Making of the Charter,in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION:
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1, 1-77 (Joseph Weiler & Robin Elliot eds., 1986);
Lorraine Weinrib, Of Diligence and Dice: Reconstituting Canada's Constitution, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 207,
208-18 (1992).
19. For a detailed review of the submissions of equality-seeking groups to the Special Joint Committee, see
Bruce Porter, Twenty Years of Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectations, 23 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST.
145, 149 (2005).
20. For a more complex analysis of the competing centralist and regionalist tensions during domestic
negotiations, see Thomas S. Axworthy, Colliding Visions: The Debate over the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms 1980-81, in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION: THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND

FREEDOMS, supranote 18, at 13, 13-26.
21. For an analysis of what women wished to avoid and wished to see in the new equality guarantees, see,
for example, Mary Eberts, Women and Constitutional Renewal, in WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
CANADA 3 (Audrey Doerr & Micheline Carrier eds., 1981), and Beverley Baines, Women, Human Rights and
the Constitution, in WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION IN CANADA supra, at 31. See also Submission of the
Canadian Advisory Council of the Status of Women to the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution,
November 18, 1980 reprinted as Women, Human Rights and the Constitution, (1981) 2 C.H.R.R. C35
[hereafter "CACSW Submission"].
22. See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky, Defining Equality Rights, in EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1, 13-14 (Anne Bayefsky & Mary Eberts eds., 1985). This book also

contains reviews of pre-Charter domestic and international jurisprudence, Charter lobbying, and analysis of the
potential impacts of the final text of the Charter for discrimination claims based on ethnicity, religion, sex, age,
physical and mental disability, marital status, and sexual orientation. Key conferences anticipating the coming
into force of the equality guarantees routinely included American constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Kent
Greenawalt, A Neighbour's Reflections on Equality Rights, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW
EQUALITY RIGHTS 189 (Lynn Smith et al. eds., 1986); Stephen L. Spitz, LitigationStrategy in Equality Rights:
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that the new equality guarantees had to be drafted in ways that would preclude judges'
timid approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights and their narrow interpretation of the
equality guarantees. 2 3 To this end, a remarkable degree of consensus formed around
three goals requiring amendment to the federally tabled draft. First, the equality
guarantee must be expansively drafted to go beyond formal equality and extend to
equality in the substance of the law and equality in allocations of state benefits. As well,
the enumerated list of prohibited grounds of discrimination should be open ended to
allow for recognition of new grounds without the requirement of satisfying the high
threshold for constitutional amendment. Second, the equality guarantee should not only
protect affirmative action measures but impose positive obligations on government to
redress existing inequalities. Finally, successive drafts of the Charter contained an
explicit limitation clause specifying the parameters of the provincial and federal
governments' authority to place limits on the rights and freedoms entrenched in the
Charter.24 In all drafts, the limitations clause was expansively framed. Rights-seeking
groups concurred that the limitations clause must be narrowly framed.25 Feminists
associated with the CACSW also sought to secure language that would ensure sex
discrimination claims received heightened scrutiny if equality rights were limited. 26
The equality lobby was highly successful in its efforts. The penultimate draft of the
equality guarantee had read as follows:
Non-discrimination Rights
15(1) Everyone has the right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the
law without discrimination because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age
or sex.
15(2) This section does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups.
The final text now reads:
Equality Rights
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equalprotection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
15 (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that

The American Experience, in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION: THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS, supra note 18, at 385; Wendy Williams, Sex Discrimination Under the Charter: Some

Problems of Theory, paper presented at Charter of Rights Educational Fund Conference on Sex Discrimination:
An Overview of Canadian Law, Feb. 19, 1983, reprintedin 4 CANADIAN HUM. RTS. REP. C/83-1 (1983).
23. Almost one quarter of all presentations to the Joint Committee focused on the equality guarantee. Of
thirty-two submissions favouring entrenchment of an equality guarantee, only one, by an individual, endorsed
the language as drafted in late fall 1980. DALE GlasoN, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER: EQUALITY RIGHTS 42
(1990).
24. See Bayefsky, supra note 22, at 70-73 (earlier drafts of the limitations clause).
25. See CACSW Submission, supra note 21; Anne F. Bayefsky, The Orientation of Section 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION: THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 18, at 105; Porter, supra note 19, at 150-56.

26. See CACSW Submission, supra note 21.
27. Bayefsky, supranote 22, at 10.
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are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
28
mental or physical disability.
28 Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are
29
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
The limitations clause was also narrowed as a result of the lobbying of equality
advocates. The penultimate draft would have allowed government to place such limits on
rights as are "generally accepted" in a Parliamentary democracy. 30 The final draft
required limits to be "prescribed by law," rather than imposed by administrative or
executive discretion, and to be "demonstrably justified" by the state. 3 1
The coming into force of section 15 was delayed three years after the rest of the
Charter took effect, ostensibly to allow the provincial and federal governments to review
their statutes and regulations and to amend them, as needed, to conform to the expansive
new equality rights in the Charter. In fact, the delay yielded little from government, but
across the country feminists conducted their own statute audits to identify laws in need
of revision or repeal.32 This undertaking required the feminists involved to immerse
themselves in feminist legal theory to try to identify the most effective equality approach
for litigating sections 15 and 28 claims. At the time, the special treatment/equal treatment
debates about pregnancy leave were dividing U.S. feminist theorists. 33 There was no
such division in Canadian feminist legal circles 34 largely because jurisprudence under
the Canadian Bill of Rights so decisively demonstrated the limits of a formal equality
approach.35 Consensus was widespread and strong in favour of what was variously
referred to as a "substantive equality" or "equality of results" approach or a strategy for
achieving a "fair share of social resources."36 Feminist legal advocates also tended to

28. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 15 (U.K).
29. Id. at § 28. The elaborate history of the fight to secure entrenchment of section 28 is described in
PENNEY KOME, THE TAKING OF TWENTY-EIGHT (1983). For an overview of the numerous battles fought by

women against male political leaders throughout the patriation process, see Chaviva Hosek, Women and the
ConstitutionalProcess,in AND NO ONE CHEERED, supra note 18, at 280.
30. Bayefsky, supra note 22, at 72.
3 1. Id.
32. See GIBsoN, supra note 23, at 44 n.183 (list of the government reports and of the feminist audits
produced). Gibson states that governments were "far from whole-hearted" and very cautious in their responses.
Id. at 44. For criticism of governments' inaction, see Mary Eberts, A Strategyfor Equality Litigation Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION: THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 18, at 411.

33. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality andDfference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2
(1984); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 955 (1984); Wendy
Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv.
OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 326 (1985).
34. There were multiple political strains of feminism, including liberal, socialist, and cultural feminism,
within the Canadian women's movement. Socialist feminists, for instance, were highly skeptical about resort to
courts for egalitarian change. However, within feminist legal circles, there was little support for the formal
equality approach. For a summary of the different strains of Canadian feminism, see Susan B. Boyd &
Elizabeth A. Sheehy, Feminist Perspectiveson Law: Canadian Theory andPractice,2 CANADIAN J. WOMEN &
L. 1, 8-13, 16-18 (1986).
35. Formal equality was nevertheless pursued in some law reform efforts. Rape law was comprehensively
overhauled in the early 1980s to eliminate formally unequal treatment of women and men, and of subcategories
of women who reported rape and indecent assault. See Sheila McIntyre, Tracking and Resisting Backlash
Against Equality Gains in Sexual Offence Law, CANADIAN WOMAN STUD., Fall 2000, at 72, 74-75.
36. See, e.g., Baines, supra note 21; Mary Eberts, Sex-Based Discriminationand the Charter,in EQUALITY
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favour the development of contextualized reform strategies tailored to the particular
inequality problem being addressed. 37 With few exceptions, Canadian feminist writing
of the early 1980s illustrated the substantive potential of the new equality guarantees in
relation to embedded social, economic, and legal inequalities stemming from women's
reproductive and childrearing roles and from political disenfranchisement and
marginalization, all overlaid with centuries of ascribed inferiority.38 Some writing linked
these indicia of systemic inferiority to male violence against women. 39 Such embedded
inequalities were the substance to be remedied by equality law. But such issues as why,
how, and in whose interests it is that the social costs of reproduction are so asymmetrical
and so devalue women's reproductive and paid labour; why male violence against
women is so endemic; why female gender co-relates with poverty; and why women's
second-class status is so normalized in law and politics were little theorized in the
pragmatic push to prepare for the first section 15 cases.40
During this period, a study was funded by the CACSW of the NAACP and the
ACLU to evaluate the potential of establishing a litigation arm for the Canadian
women's movement. 4 1 The study recommended that a permanent legal action fund
operating on a national basis be established to finance Charter sex equality litigation. In
response, the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund ("LEAF") was founded in
1985 to handpick equality test cases that would incrementally build a substantive
equality jurisprudence while also undertaking public education favoring achievement of
women's equality through law. 4 2
Finally, during the time between entrenchment of the Charter and when the first
section 15 case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, human rights litigators were
securing the doctrinal building blocks for substantive equality jurisprudence. In 1982, the
Court had repudiated narrow, technical readings of human rights statutes in favour of a
broad, generous interpretive approach consistent with their remedial purpose.43 By 1985,
the Supreme Court of Canada had held unanimously that discriminatory intent need not
be proved to establish violation of an antidiscrimination statute, had recognized the

RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 22, at 183, 186-87; Jill McCalla

Vickers, Equality Theories and Their Results: Equality-Seeking in a Cold Climate, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE:
CANADA'S NEW EQUALITY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 3, 8-9; Mary Jane Mossman, Gender, Equality and the
Charter, in EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT: A ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 299 (Rosalie S. Abella ed., 1985);
Lynn Smith, A New Paradigmfor Equality Rights, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW EQUALITY

RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 353; N. Colleen Sheppard, Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the
CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms, 10 DALHOUSIE L.J. 195, 196-98 (1986).
37. See Eberts, supra note 36, at 189-90; Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
169, 170-71 (1987).'
38. See Eberts, supra note 36, 189-90.
39. See, e.g., CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE & LEAH COHEN, THE SECRET OPPRESSION: SEXUAL HARASSMENT

OF WORKING WOMEN (1978); Micheline Carrier, Women's Rights and "National Interests", in WOMEN AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN CANADA, supra note 21, at 181, 197-98; Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault and the
Feminist Judge, 1CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 93 (1985).
40. There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., BACKHOUSE & COHEN, supra note 39; LORENNE CLARK
& DEBRA LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977).
41. See BETH ATCHESON, MARY EBERTS, BETH SYMES & JENNIFER STODDARD, WOMEN AND LEGAL
ACTION: PRECEDENTS, RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (1984).
42. For a critical history of the founding of LEAF, see SHERENE RAZACK, CANADIAN FEMINISM AND THE
LAW: THE WOMEN's LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION FUND AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY (1991).

43. See Ins. Corp. of B. C. v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, 157-58 (Can.).
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concept of adverse-effect discrimination, and had read an implied duty of reasonable
accommodation into human rights law. 44 In 1987, the Court also recognized the
existence of systemic discrimination and endorsed the use of systemic remedies,
including imposed hiring quotas, for its redress. 45
It was during the three-year moratorium that Professor MacKinnon's two Signs
articles46 began circulating in law school classes, feminist conferences, and statute audit
circles. Professor MacKinnon was invited to address a National Symposium on Equality
Rights in Toronto just before the coming into force of section 15. There, she delivered a
paper entitled Making Sex Equality Real47 which core analysis echoes her "Difference
and Dominance" chapter in Feminism Unmodified.48 From there, she was recruited by
the Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario to work on Tomen, the first
section 15 case filed when the moratorium expired. 49 In that case, a six-woman team
theorized a substantive equality argument and amassed an evidentiary record in defence
of all-woman organizational structures as vehicles to advance women's equality. 50
Professor MacKinnon was also invited to serve on LEAF's National Legal Committee
from 1987 to 1991, when the most important wave of equality cases in the post-Charter
era reached our Supreme Court.
PART II: THE CONTRIBUTION

Twenty-five years later it is impossible to recapture the jolt of first encounters with
Professor MacKinnon's two Signs articles 51 and the speeches she published in Feminism
Unmodified.52 In Canada, the embrace of substantive equality in feminist legal circles
had not yet settled into a coherent theory or legal strategy, and then, suddenly,
dominance theory drew the pieces together and, with its embrace by the paid and pro

44. Ont. Human Rights Comm'n v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (Can.).
45. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co. v. Canadian Human Rights Comm'n, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114,1139-46 (Can.).
46. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS
515 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence].
47. Reprinted in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW EQUALITY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 37. For a

report on the conference, see Sheila McIntyre, The Charter:Driving Women to Abstraction, 6 BROADSIDE 8
(1985), reprinted in WOMEN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CORE READINGS AND CURRENT ISSUES 315 (T.

Brettel Dawson ed., 1990).
48. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Diference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987). This chapter was delivered first as a speech in 1984.
49. The Tomen case is comprised of multiple legal proceedings in administrative, human rights, and
constitutional law. Margaret Tomen challenged the existence of the only all-woman labour union in the country
on the basis that its single sex organizational structure was sex discrimination contrary to human rights
legislation and the Charter. For a comprehensive history and critical analysis of the legal proceedings, see
Karen Schucher, Contesting Women's Solidarity: Human Rights Law and the FWTAO Membership Case
(2006) (LLM thesis, York Univ.) (on file with Library and Archives Canada).
50. For the argument advanced and the record compiled to support that argument, see MARY EBERTS,
FLORENCE I. HENDERSON, KATHLEEN A. LAHEY, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SHEILA MCINTYRE &
ELIZABETH J. SHILTON, THE CASE FOR WOMEN's EQUALITY: THE FEDERATION OF WOMEN TEACHERS'
ASSOCIATIONS OF ONTARIO AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (1991).
51. MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 46; MacKinnon, TowardFeminist Jurisprudence,supra
note 46.
52. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 48.
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bono lawyers at LEAF,5 3 defined the approach that thereafter animated sex equality
litigation in Canada.
Let me remind you of the purest distillation of the theory. Under a formal equality
approach, MacKinnon argued, the "underlying story" of sex-based social, economic,
political, and legal differences between the sexes is:
[O]n the first day, difference was, on the second day, a division was created upon it, on the
third day, irration instances of dominace arose. Division may be rational or irrational.
Dominance either seems or is justified. Difference is.54
By contrast, the underlying story of the dominance approach to (in)equality that
has been imported into the substantive equality advocacy of LEAF is:
[O]n the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by force. By the second
day, division along the same lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if
not sooner, differences were demarcated, together with social systems to exaggerate them
in perception and in fact, because the systematically differential delivery of benefits and
deprivations required making no mistake about who was who. Comparatively speaking,
man has been resting ever since. 55
This approach was built from observing and aggregating the particulars of
women's lives under conditions of male domination, conditions infused and inflected by
multiple other relations of domination - race, class, disability, religion, and so on.56 For
women, these multiple relations of domination converge in patterns of inequality
including:
unequal pay, allocation to disrespected work, demeaned physical characteristics; targeting
for rape, domestic battery, sexual abuse as children, and systemic sexual harassment;
depersonalization, use in denigrating entertainment, and forced prostitution .. .. [I1n an
historical context characterized by disenfranchisement, preclusion from property
ownership, exclusion from public life, and a sex-based poverty and devaluation of
women's contributions in all spheres of social life .... 57
The quoted passage comes from LEAF's factum in Andrews, the first section 15
case heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.58 You should recognize MacKinnon's
thinking and cadence here. She was a key player in formulating the Andrews argument
53. Sherene Razack's history of LEAF emphasizes the degree to which a very small number of
predominantly white and middle-class feminists shaped both the lobbying that secured the current text of
section 15 and, thereafter, litigation strategy. RAZACK, supra note 42. A clear majority subscribed to a
substantive equality approach compatible with dominance theory. The lack of diversity within LEAF
compromised its credibility within the broader women's community until LEAF took significant steps to
correct the problem. Over the years, as personnel changed, the approach to substantivism sometimes varied.
However, promotion of a formal equality approach has never been LEAF's strategy.
54. MacKinnon, supra note 48, at 34.
55. Id. at 40.
56. For the first example of this aggregated methodology leading to the construction and application of
dominance theory, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).

57. Factum of the Women's Legal Educaion and Action Fund (LEAF) para. 51, Andrews v. Law Soc'y of
B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.), availableat www.leaf.callegal/briefs/1989-andrews.html#target. In Canada,
a factum is the written argument filed in advance of an appeal. Third parties may be granted leave to file facta
and, with further leave, to make oral arguments at the appeal as "interveners," who play a role similar to that
played by amici curiae in U.S. courts. All LEAF facta can be found at www.leaf.ca/legallindex.html#target.
58. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] I S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
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which I will discuss later.
The dominance approach has a methodology. Do not start with law as it is,
especially equality law as it is, and try to fit women's claims into it. Women are
subordinated in and to and by male law, including liberal equality law. Start with the
reality of women's lives under conditions of enforced systemic inequality, unpack
inequality's dynamics and distributions and rationalizations, and determine how law is
implicated. Then, demand that equality guarantees redress - not just for those lived
inequalities, but end law's complicity in enabling and legitimating them.
As an illustration, consider LEAF's parliamentary brief supporting draft legislation
to restrict pretrial production to defence counsel of a vast range of confidential personal
records documenting a sexual assault complainant's medical, counseling, child welfare,
corrections, and other history, a tactic intended to intimidate complainants and to troll for
credibility-eroding arguments. 59 The brief's table of contents reflects the methodology
developed by Professor MacKinnon. Its subheadings summarize the constitutional
equality argument for parliamentary committee members who might not have troubled to
read the full document and who needed a simple tutorial to understand why protection of
complainants' records was an equality issue subject to constitutional law.
After setting out LEAF's expertise in litigating equality claims, including claims
focused on criminal sexual offence laws, the brief broke down how inequality infused
the development and application of sexual assault doctrine and procedure, how reforms
in 1992 (Bill C-49) sought to redress specific discriminatory components of law, and
how new discriminatory practices emerged to evade reforms that restricted defence
access to complainants' sexual history. The subheadings were as follows:
(a) Inequality in Law;60 (b) Inequality in Sexual Assault Law;61 (c) Sexual Violence as a
Practice of Inequality;62 (d) Legislation to Curb Inequality in the Operation of Sexual
Assault Law;63 (e) Bill C-49: Reforming Sexual Assault Law to Conform with All Charter
Guarantees;64 (f) Defence Requests for Access to Complainants' Records: (i) End-Run
Around Anti-Discrimination Features of Bill C-49; (ii)New Defences for a New Class of
Defendants; 65 and (iii) Targeting Equality-Promoting Services. 6 6
59. Jennifer Scott & Sheila McIntyre, Submissions to Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs:
Review of Bill C-46, LEAF, 7-8 (Mar. 1997), http://www.leaf.callegal/submissions/1997-billc46.pdf#target.
60. Id at 2-3 (emphasizing that, until very recently, all laws were enacted, enforced, interpreted, and
applied exclusively by white, propertied men, while women could not vote, hold public office, practice law, or
sit on juries; most laws pre-date the advent of modern human rights norms and Canadian equality guarantees).
61. Id. at 3-5 (noting that men, the group responsible for ninety-nine percent of all sexual offences, wrote
and enforce sexual-assault laws without regard for the experience and perspective of women and children, the
primary targets of male sexual aggression, in what remains a pervasively sexually unequal culture; by default,
they reflected and normalized the unequal rights, roles, and sexual standards assigned by men to women). This
section is illustrated with examples of bias in law and procedure.
62. Id at 5-7 (documenting that the more powerless an individual, the more vulnerable to sexual
exploitation and violence, particularly by individuals s/he knows who occupy positions of power, authority, or
trust in relation to her or him, and that such power insulates many abusers from exposure and legal sanction).
63. Id. at 7-8 (discussing judicial resistance to criminal reforms of 1976, 1983, and 1992 and defence tactics
to evade them).
64. Scott & McIntyre, supra note 59, at 8-11 (discussing in detail the equality-driven amendments
responsive to judicial invalidation in 1991 of statutory restrictions on sexual history evidence as
unconstitutional infringements of fair trial rights).
65. Id. at 13-14 (noting that feminist activism and reforms generated more reporting and prosecution of
sexual assaults committed by privileged and powerful men who, in turn, devoted uncommon resources to
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The third part of the brief offered a detailed substantive equality critique of the
case law on disclosure of personal records and an extended explication of the
constitutional equality principles and imperatives underpinning proposed legislative
reforms responsive to that case law. This portion of the argument also analyzed several
specific inequality issues raised by broad defence access to such confidential records,
such as the inherent unreliability of some of the records pursued,67 inequalities exploited
in legal proceedings,68 discriminatory premises underlying disclosure requests or
production orders,69 and discriminatory impacts on persons living with recurring
physical or mental health problems. 70
The structure of the brief perfectly captures MacKinnon's method: start with the
material particulars of inequality to determine what an equality guarantee mandates, not
the other way around. In my view, this profound shift in focus, once articulated, is
actually the easy part, and LEAF litigation teams - working in and through collective
processes with Catharine - got pretty good at it. The harder part is exiting the passive
professional voice that describes inequality as if it has no author or internal logic or
beneficiary or collaborators - that educates courts about women's inequality
descriptively without pointing fingers. Going only half way to the descriptive leaves
women "othered," the objects of legal study, pinned in the legal mind as "different."7 1
Rape, spousal terrorism, femicide, prostitution, sex tourism and trafficking, the
pornification of all media,72 lack of reproductive autonomy, unequal pay, job
segregation, poisoned work environments, misogynist "jokes," political marginalization,
lack of credit and credibility - the dominance approach insists on tracking these
manifestations and practices of sex inequality in the unexpurgated version back to their
source - that is, to dominators and domination. This is where many legal feminists lose
their nerve and where Professor MacKinnon never has.
Before offering a sampler of section 15 cases argued during Professor
MacKinnon's years of partnership with LEAF, let me paint her jurisprudential impact in
broad strokes.
First, more women's issues were framed squarely as equality challenges developing new means of attacking complainants' credibility).
66. Id. at 14-15 (noting that many disclosure requests focus on records of rape crisis centres, hospital sexual
assault centres, and feminist therapists).
67. Id. at 20-21 (e.g., where the author of the records, a doctor, probation officer, or counselor, may be the
abuser or where the records were generated by institutions such as Aboriginal residential schools that were
premised on supremacist ideologies about the cultural inferiority of residents).
68. Id. at 21-22 (such as complainants' ignorance of their right to refuse to produce confidential records to
police as a condition of having their assault report processed).
69. Scott & McIntyre, supra note 59, at 22-24 (such as arguments for access to records that invoked
evidentiary rules that were repealed on the basis of their discriminatory premises, including corroboration,
recent complaint, and sexual reputation rules).
70. Id. at 24-26 (showing compounding effects of discrimination-based pursuit of records on
discrimination-based violation, and underlining adverse effects on therapeutic treatment of the threat of
disclosure of therapy records).
71. For a critique of Canadian equality jurisprudence for going only half way, see Sheila McIntyre,
Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the Subjects and Verbs of Domination, in MAKING
EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL: SECURING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY UNDER THE CHARTER 99, 100 (Fay Faraday et
al. eds., 2006).
72. I am grateful to Professor Radha Jhappan for introducing me to the term "pornification" and for
discussions we have had about the socio-political trends it encompasses.
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substantive equality challenges. For instance, reproductive choice cases were litigated
under section 15, not under constitutional guarantees of liberty or privacy. 73 Efforts by
criminal defence lawyers to expand admissibility at trial of so-called "evidence" of
complainants' actual, ascribed, or invented sexual history were countered by invoking
the equality guarantees, not complainants' rights to privacy or security of the person. 74
Likewise efforts to have unrestricted pre-trial access to complainants' personal records
were opposed by reference to constitutional equality rights, not to privacy rights. 75
Second, doctrine not previously viewed through an equality lens was
reconceptualized and litigated on the basis of substantive equality principles. The rules of
standing were challenged as inconsistent with constitutional equality guarantees on the
basis that they privileged access to the courts by individual litigants claiming personal
injury to recognized private legal interests over litigants asserting claims against
government in the public interest, often asserting injuries historically unrecognized by
laws that map the interests of the privileged. 7 Constitutional remedies law was also
transformed to map substantive equality principles. Encouraged by LEAF, and over
strong government objections, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the novel remedy
of ordering state benefits extended to groups unconstitutionally excluded in breach of
section 15. The Court rejected formal equality arguments restricting its remedial options
to striking down exclusions explicitly contained in a statute or striking down benefits for
all in the case of exclusion by omission. It held that the substance of the exclusion
dictates remedy, not the technique of drafting it.7 7
Third, LEAF challenged the public/private distinction, intervening successfully in
private law cases to argue that judges must apply the common law in a manner that
conforms to the Constitution's equality guarantees. 78 The insulation of private relations
from constitutional scrutiny was challenged, exposing the implication of law's
public/private distinction in women's oppression. LEAF also intervened in several

73. See, e.g., R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489 (Can.) (sex equality argument against criminal
proceedings for harm to fetus during birth process prior to its being born alive); Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 530 (Can.) (civil injunction to prevent pregnant woman from terminating pregnancy infringes women's
rights to equality and equal right to security of the person); Borowski v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R.
342 (Can.) (sex equality argument against constitutional recognition of fetal personhood).' Intervener facta for
all three Supreme Court of Canada appeals can be found at www.leaf.calegal/search.html#target.
74. See R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.). See also Factum of the Intervener
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund et al., Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. 577, available at
www.leaf.callegal/briefs/1992-seaboyer.html#target.
75. See R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (Can.). See also Factum of the Intervenors Aboriginal
Women's Council et al., O'Connor, 4 S.C.R. 411, available at www.leaf.ca/legal/briefs/1995oconnor.html#target.
76. See Canadian Council of Churches v. The Queen, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.). See also Factum of the
Interveners, Women's Legal Education and Action (LEAF) and Canadian Disability Rights Council (CDRC),
Canadian Council of Churches, 1 S.C.R. 236, available at www.leafcallegal/briefs/1992-canadian-councilchurches.html#target.
77. See Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (Can.). See also Factum of the Respondent/Intervenor
Education and Action Fund, Schachter, 2 S.C.R. 679, available at
Women's Legal
www.leaf.callegal/briefs/I 992-schachter.html#target.
78. See, e.g., M.(K.) v. M.(H)., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (Can.) (doctrine of reasonable discoverability in tort
action for incestuous assault interpreted in light of equality principles); Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R.
224 (Can.) (defence of consent unavailable in tort action for sexual assault against physician who illegally
prescribed pain killers to addicted patient in exchange for sex given exploitation of inequality between parties).
The LEAF facta for both cases is available at www.leaf callegal/search.html#target.
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family law disputes to argue that family law legislation must be interpreted in light of
constitutional equality guarantees so that women's economic inequality within marriage
and in the labour market would be taken into account in determining quantum of spousal
support, parental rights, and division of assets upon marriage breakdown. 79
Finally, the language in LEAF's facta and legislative briefs was less abstract, less
legalistic, less filtered for judicial comfort; it was more concrete and fact driven, more
demanding, more urgent, less hedged. Legal training socializes practitioners to tame their
language and arguments to professional norms, to worry about angering or alienating
judges or attracting ridicule from professional peers. It schools us to tailor arguments so
that they will appear "reasonable" to those above, rather than to advocate for what is
necessary and nonnegotiable to those below.
For instance, arguing against the constitutional recognition of fetal personhood,
LEAF noted that a typical characteristic of fetal rights advocates like the appellant is to
ignore the rights of the pregnant woman:
[T]he woman registers as a void insofar as her own rights or even existence are concerned.
When ... her existence is acknowledged [it is] viewed as a clear threat. She is seen as
separate from her own foetus, and menacing to it, either by presenting a hostile
environment to its development or by actively refusing some proposed medical
intervention. She is a force to be either erased or controlled, managed or circumscribed in
the interests of the foetus. 8 1
In another fetal rights case, Daigle v. Tremblay,8 2 the LEAF factum argued:
Women often do not control the conditions under which they become pregnant. Up to the
the
present day, the context of social inequality has denied women control over
reproductive uses of their bodies. Women have been socially disadvantaged in regard to
control of sexual access because of the particular socialization they receive, lack [of
information], inadequate or unsafe contraceptive technology, social pressure . . . custom,
poverty and enforced economic dependence, sexual coercion, and the ineffective
enforcement of laws against sexual assault. Nor do women control the social consequences
of their pregnancies. Women's role in childbearing has provided a particular occasion and
from
pretext for women's disadvantagement, including the exclusion of pregnant women

79. Dickie v. Dickie, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346 (Can.) (remedies for breach of support order); Boston v. Boston,
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 43 (Can.) (division of pension assets upon separation); Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27
(Can.) (right of custodial parent to relocate for employment); Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (Can.)
(support variation orders on remarriage of payor).
80. See Borowski v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Can.). Mr. Borowski, an anti-abortion
activist, sought public interest standing to challenge Canada's abortion laws on the basis that their legalization
of abortion under highly restrictive conditions violated the constitutional right of the fetus to security of the
person. His claim would have required judicial recognition of fetal personhood for the first time in Canadian
law. By the time his standing claim reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it was moot; the abortion law he
was challenging was struck down as unconstitutionally restrictive of women's security of the person in R. v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
81. Factum of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) para. 22, Borowski, I S.C.R. 342,
available at www.leaf callegal/briefs/1989-borowski.html#target.
82. Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.). Tremblay coerced Daigle to forego using birth control
when they cohabited. He was also physically abusive. Daigle left him and discovered she was pregnant. When
Tremblay learned she was seeking an abortion, he secured a civil injunction to stop her. He succeeded at trial
and on appeal. During the hearing of the final appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court was advised
she had secured an abortion. Nonetheless, the Court struck down the injunction, the fetal rights, and father's
rights claims on which it rested. Id.
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and stigmatization of women in society and work.
In sex equality terms, this case presents an attempt by a man to control the life of a woman
by forcing her, through government intervention, to become a mother.
A woman's relation to the foetus is unique and inseparable: what happens to it, happens to
her. He who controls it, controls her, as this case makes abundantly clear. Indeed, this case
is an example of an attempt to control the woman through controlling the foetus. Several
justices [in the courts below] misconstrue this case as a conflict between the mother and
the foetus. It is a conflict between a woman and a man over that woman's body, life, and
83
relation to her foetus.
During her years at LEAF and well beyond, Professor MacKinnon's insistence on
the urgency of action, on never losing sight of the body count from sex inequality, and
on never forgetting for whom feminist equality advocates are working and to whom we
are accountable emboldened everyone involved in LEAF litigation.
I am not saying Canadian feminist legal activists would have achieved none of
these breakthroughs had we not worked with Catharine during the formative years of
section 15 litigation. I hope my review of Canadian legal history illuminates the
domestic context in which her contributions were made possible. As well, the ideas,
arguments, and texts of each factum or brief were shaped by the collective brainstorming
of teams of stellar feminist legal thinkers and veteran litigators, not by a single mind or
pen. However, Catharine's ideas and voice and distinctive way of connecting the dots
from dominance in men's laws to subordination in women's lives are clearly
recognizable in LEAF documents from 1987 onward. 84 Without her direct involvement
in LEAF's work, I think the dominance approach would have stood as but one school of
thought in Canadian equality theory. Instead, because LEAF occupied the equality
litigation field, LEAF's embrace of MacKinnon's dominance approach became THE
approach to equality rights that for about fifteen years distinguished Canadian
jurisprudence and served as the model for equality law in other nations. Long after
Catharine stopped working directly with LEAF, that approach shaped the bulk of
LEAF's advocacy. While LEAF's strengths have ebbed along with other components of
contemporary feminism, the facta from that era continue to be studied as paradigms of
equality analysis.
Professor MacKinnon was closely involved in theorizing and drafting ten LEAF
facta and assisted in the crafting of nine others. This record includes Andrews, which set
the direction of section 15 jurisprudence;85 eight cases dealing with laws related to male
sexual violence; 86 four dealing with women's reproductive autonomy; 87 four hate
83. Memorandum of Facts and Law Submitted by the Intervenor, the Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund paras. 33, 36, 37, Daigle, 2 S.C.R. 530, available at www.leaf.callegal/briefs/1989-daigle.html#target.
84. This phrasing is drawn from MacKinnon's collection of essays, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
WOMEN'S LIVES - MEN'S LAWS (2005).
85. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
86. M.(K.) v. M.(H)., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (Can.) (doctrine of reasonable discoverability in tort action for
incestuous assault interpreted in light of equality principles); Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224 (Can.)
(defence of consent unavailable in tort action for sexual assault against physician who illegally prescribed pain
killers to addicted patient in exchange for sex given exploitation of inequality between parties); R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.) (defence of constitutionality of criminal obscenity law); R. v. Seaboyer; R v.
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propaganda cases;8 8 and one case each on public interest standing, 89 remedies, 90 and the
right of raped woman to sue police for misconduct of rape investigation. 9 1 I will briefly
discuss four of these cases.
Andrews v. Law Society of B.C 92
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia was the first section 15 decision to
reach the Supreme Court of Canada. The case was a challenge to the requirement of
Canadian citizenship as a prerequisite to admission to the bar of British Columbia.
Citizenship was not an enumerated prohibited ground within section 15. The Court
determined that the equality guarantees should be read the same way as the
antidiscrimination guarantees in human rights statutes. Hence, it held that section 15
prohibits both direct and adverse effect discrimination by government actors and, thus,
that challengers need not prove discriminatory intent on the part of legislatures or
government bureaucrats in order to make out an infringement of section 15.93 Relatedly,
it affirmed that the focus of a section 15 analysis should be discriminatory effects. 94
The principle section 15 reasons, authored by Justice William McIntyre, were
adopted by the entire Court. Justice McIntyre acknowledged the "well known" 95
shortcomings of the Court's Bill of Rights decisions and explicitly repudiated a formal
equality approach to section 15 as "seriously deficient,"96 too "mechanical"
and
capable of upholding substantively bad laws, so long as they are even-handedly applied
to all. Instead of the blindfolded justice called for by formalists, he urged a contextual
approach to the guarantee. Justice McIntyre emphasized that identical treatment of social
unequals can produce real inequality and that, likewise, sometimes differential treatment
Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.) (unsuccessful defence of broad exclusion of sexual-history evidence in
criminal sexual assault trials); Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 (Can.) (defining sexual
harassment as sex discrimination violating human rights statute); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Att'y
Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 (Can.) (defence of publication ban of identity of sexual assault complainant).
87. R. v. Sullivan, [1991] I S.C.R. 489 (Can.) (arguing against fetal personhood in prosecution of midwives
for criminal negligence during delivery); Daigle, 2 S.C.R. 530 (arguing against fetal personhood as basis for
awarding civil injunction against woman seeking abortion opposed by estranged putative father); Brooks v.
Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (Can.) (pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination, overturning
prior jurisprudence); Borowski v. Can. (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Can.) (arguing against fetal
personhood in third party challenge to constitutionality of laws permitting abortion).
88. Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R 892 (Can.) (constitutionality of hate propaganda prohibitions in
human rights legislation); R. v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (Can.) (constitutionality of criminal prohibitions
on hate propaganda); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.); Kane v. Church of Jesus Christ ChristianAryan Nations (No. 3), (1992) 18 C.H.R.R. D/268 (Can. Alta. Bd. of Inquiry) (interpretation of hate
propaganda proscription in human rights legislation).
89. Canadian Council of Churches v. The Queen, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.) (unsuccessful argument for
expansion of public interest standing).
90. Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (Can.) (judicial power to extend unconstitutionally
underinclusive benefits).
91. Jane Doe v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Police for the Mun. of Metro. Toronto (1989), 58 D.L.R. 4th 396 (Can.
Ont. Div. Ct. ), aff'd (1990), 74 D.L.R. 4th 580 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (arguing for damages for breach of equality
rights and for negligence in failure to warn raped woman of serial rapist in neighbourhood).
92. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
93. Id. at 164, 173, 175.
94. Id. at 173.
95. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 166.
97. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 167.
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is required to achieve "true" equality. The essence of equality, he held, is the
accommodation of difference. 98
Two formalist approaches had been urged on the Court. The first, proposed by a
distinguished Canadian constitutional scholar, Professor Peter W. Hogg, would have
required every legal distinction drawn on enumerated ground to be demonstrably
justified under section 1. Justice McIntyre reasoned that this approach left too much
work for section I and stripped section 15 of meaningful substance. Because all laws
draw distinctions, government line drawing per se was insufficient to establish an
infringement of section 15.99 Hence, only state-authored distinctions that "discriminate"
required justification. In defining "discrimination," he rejected the Aristotelian "treat
likes alike" approach and the "similarly situated" versions of formal equality. 100 He also
repudiated the approach adopted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal which
combined a similarly situated approach to the guaranteel10 with built-in limits on section
15 akin to the "rational basis" and "valid federal objectives" standard that had marked
Bill of Rights jurisprudence. Justice McIntyre rejected any injection of internal limits on
the equality guarantee through the incorporation of a reasonableness test into section 15
for three reasons. First, it contradicts the internal architecture of the Charter where
justification of Charter infringements is to be left to section I and where the government
bears the onus of justifying the limitation of rights. Second, it leaves little work for
section 1. Finally, it places too high a burden on challengers who lack government
resources and knowledge about the reasoning underlying the policy choices that limit
constitutional rights.1 02
Having rejected a formal equality approach, the Court accepted LEAF's arguments
in favour of a "third approach," which finds the meaning of "discrimination" in the
purpose of the guarantee as reflected by its enumeration of prohibited grounds of
discrimination. LEAF had argued that the expansively worded guarantees were intended
to promote the substantive equality of the "powerless, the excluded, [and] the
disadvantaged" - that is, those "individuals and groups which historically have had
unequal access to social and economic resources, either because of overt discrimination
or because of the adverse effects of apparently 'neutral' forms of social organization
premised on the subordination of certain groups and the dominance of others." 1 03 In this
approach, the enumerated grounds reflect historical bases of subordination. Hence, legal
distinctions that reflect and reinforce the disadvantage of groups identified by these
grounds are discriminatory infringements of section 15 which the state must
demonstrably justify to a rigorous standard of scrutiny. Differentiation aimed at
amelioration of disadvantage promotes equality as explicitly indicated by section 15(2)

98. Id at 164, 169.
99. Id. at 178,181.
100. For an excellent explanation of the limits of both formal approaches, see William Black & Lynn Smith,
The EqualityRights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 14-1, 14-7 to 14-12, 14-19 to 1420 (G6rald Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 3rd ed. 1996).
101. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., (1986), 27 D.L.R. 4th 600, 605, 609-10 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
102. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 182.
103. Factum of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) paras. 23-28, Andrews, 1 S.C.R.
143, availableat www.leaf.callegal/briefs/1 989-andrews.html#target.
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and so does not infringe the guarantee. 104
The Court unanimously adopted LEAF's approach and then established a
framework for recognizing nonenumerated grounds of discrimination under the openended language of section 15. This framework, too, embraced criteria that resonate with
a dominance approach. The Court held that new grounds must be analogous to those
enumerated in the sense that they will apply only to groups subject to "stigmatization"
and "stereotyping," "lacking in political power,"1 0 5 "marginalized in political
processes," and "vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal
concern and respect violated.". 106
Andrews was a decisive advance for substantive equality, with two caveats. First,
although the Court clearly and explicitly repudiated a formal equality approach to section
15, it never articulated a clear test for determining what converts a legal distinction into
"discrimination" contrary to section 15. In some passages, it identifies the purpose of
section 15 as the prevention of state action that reflects or perpetuates social, political,
economic, and historic disadvantage; in others, it characterizes as irrational line drawing
based on "irrelevant" personal characteristics rooted in stereotypes. Second, the Court
split evenly on whether strict or rational basis scrutiny should be adopted at the section 1
stage after an infringement of section 15 had been established.lo7 Both splits within the
Andrews bench have ebbed and flowed through section 15 case law ever since. The highwater marks for the substantive approach, in my view, are the decisions in Vriendlo8 and
Eldridge.109 With the Court's much-criticized restatement of the framework for
analyzing section 15 claims in its 1999 decision in Law v. Canada,1 10 a formal equality
approach began to define the Court's approach even while it continued to endorse a
substantive approach rhetorically. 11' In 2008, the Court acknowledged the widespread
criticisms of the results of its Law framework and declared that it would return to the
Andrews approach.112 Unfortunately, it offered no guidance on how its reasoning will
change. 113

104. Id. at paras. 33-40.
105. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 154 (Wilson, J.).
106. Id.
107. Chief Justice Dickson and Justices Wilson and L'Heureux-Dub6 supported rigorous scrutiny. Id.
Justices McIntyre, Lamer, and La Forest endorsed relaxed scrutiny. Id. at 177 (McIntyre, J.).
108. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.) (unanimous holding that a province's deliberate and
persistent refusal to include protection from sexual orientation discrimination in its comprehensive human
rights statute violates section 15; sexual orientation read into the statute by way of remedy).
109. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.) (unanimous holding that a
province's refusal to fund sign language interpretation for deaf persons seeking universally publicly funded
medical services infringes section 15; government ordered to make provision for funding sign interpretation).
110. Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).
11l. For detailed analysis of the jurisprudence subsequent to the Law decision, see DIMINISHING RETURNS:
INEQUALITY AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers

eds., 2006), and the uniformly critical essays collected in MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL: SECURING
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY UNDER THE CHARTER, supra note 71.

112. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (Can.) (finding that the modest scheme of exclusive fishing rights
to honour constitutional Aboriginal rights obligations is not race discrimination against non-Aboriginals,
contrary to the Charter).
113. For criticisms of the Kapp decision, see Patricia Hughes, Resiling from Reconciling? Musing on R. v.
Kapp, 47 S.C.L.R.2d 255 (Oct. 2009); Bruce Ryder, R. v. Kapp: Taking Section 15 Back to the Future, THE
COURT (July 2, 2008), http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/07/02/r-v-kapp-taking-section-15-back-to-the-future. For
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R. v. Keegstra 114 and R. v. Andrews & Smith1 15
Keegstra, Andrews, and Smith were hate propagandists who challenged their
criminal convictions for willfully promoting racial and religious hatred, arguing that the
law under which they were prosecuted11 6 infringed their freedom of expression under
section 2(b) of the Charter. 117 Professor MacKinnon was on the LEAF team that sought
to have section 319 upheld on substantive equality principles. LEAF argued that the
willful promotion of religious or racial hatred does not fall within the scope of the
freedom of expression guarantee for three reasons. Most importantly, it amounts to a
"practice of discrimination" contrary to section 15 insofar as it promotes group-based
hatred that "produce[s] exclusion, denigration and subordination[,] [s]tereotyping and
stigmatization" of historically disadvantaged groups" that "shapes their social image and
reputation, often controlling the opportunities of individuals members more powerfully
than their individual abilities do." 118 Second, the legislation's purpose is the promotion
of the constitutional rights to equality and multiculturalism (section 27119), while it curbs
expression that falls outside of the purpose of the guarantee.120 Finally, LEAF urged the
Court to find that the willful promotion of racial or religious hatred falls within the
violence exception to constitutionally protected speech read into section 2(b) by the
Supreme Court of Canada in earlier jurisprudence.121 LEAF argued that hate propaganda
reinforces "systemic discrimination which keeps target groups in subordinated positions
through the promotion of fear, intolerance, segregation, exclusion, disparagement,
122
vilification, degradation, violence and genocide."
the view that the Court continues to lean toward a formal equality approach even post-Kapp, see Margot
Young, Unequal to the Task: 'Kapp'-ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15, in THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: COMMITMENT, RETRENCHMENT OR RETREAT 183 (Sanda Rodgers & Sheila
McIntyre eds., 2010).
114. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (Keegstra was a high school teacher who taught his students
virulently anti-Semitic theories as gradable content in their social science instruction).
115. R. v. Andrews (Andrews & Smith), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (Can.) (Andrews and Smith were members of
the Nationalist Party of Canada, a white supremacist group, who promoted white supremacy in the party's
newspaper).'
116. They were prosecuted under the Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 319(2) (formerly §
281.2). Section 319(2) provides that "[e]very one who, by communicating statements, other than in private
conversation, willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group" is guilty" of a criminal offence and
liable to a prison term not exceeding two years. The Code defines "identifiable group" as "any section of the
public distinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation." Id. at § 318(4) (amended in
2004 to include distinction on the basis of sexual orientation). Section 281.3 (now 319(3)) provides four
defences. Id. at § 319(3).
117. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2(b) (U.K.) (guaranteeing "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication").
118. Factum of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund para. 9, Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697, availableat
http://www.leaf.ca/legal/facta/1990-keegstra.pdf#target.
119. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 27 (U.K.) ("This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.").
120. Factum of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, supranote 118, at paras. 33-35.
121. See Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.)
(union challenge to an exparte quia timet injunction against secondary picketing as breach of section 2(b)). In
ohiter remarks the Court held that, although section 2(b) does protect peaceful picketing, threats of violence or
acts of violence do not fall within the protection of the guarantee. Id. at para. 20. See also Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 978 (Can.).
122. Factum of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, supra note 118, at para. 28.
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The Court rejected these arguments for narrowing the scope of section 2(b) to
exclude hate propaganda and held that section 319 did indeed infringe section 2(b). The
question became whether the infringement was a demonstrably justifiable limit on
section 2(b) rights under section I of the Charter. LEAF urged the Court to reject the
accuseds' self-presentation as victims of unjust state interference and to understand them
as "aggressors in a social conflict between unequal groups." 1 2 3 Government enactment
of equality-promoting measures to curb the proliferation of equality-corroding conduct
cannot be unconstitutional, LEAF asserted. The argument was not that equality rights
trump speech rights but that the documented harms that hate propaganda does to the
constitutional equality, multicultural, and expressive rights of those targeted, and to the
credibility of society's constitutional commitments to equality and multiculturalism,
outweigh the low value of hate speech to a democracy premised on the dignity and worth
of all. 124
A narrow majority of the Court recognized that hate propaganda does serious harm
to its targets and to society at large. Those targeted experience psychological harms
arising from degradation and humiliation, moral harm to their fundamental human
dignity, and civic and political harms such as withdrawal from social interactions or
assimilative behaviour to reduce risk of exposure to "[t]he derision, hostility and abuse
encouraged by hate propaganda." 125 The harm to society arises from the influence of
hate propaganda in promoting discriminatory attitudes against its targets and discord
between cultural groups. The majority rejected the view that human reason is sufficient
armor against the manipulations of propaganda. Prejudice may be engendered "subtley"
and subconsciously: "Even if the message of hate propaganda is outwardly rejected, there is
evidence that its premise of racial or religious inferiority may persist in a recipient's mind as
an idea that holds some truth. . . ."126 The majority, thus, accepted that Parliament's
objective, consistent with its embrace of international human rights obligations, was to
reduce the threats to the dignity, equality, and safety of religious and racial minorities in
Canada. It also found the definition of the offence and the codified defences narrowly and
clearly tailored so as to prevent concerns about overbreadth and vagueness. Finally, it
concluded that the provision's rights-enhancing objectives outweighed its adverse effects on
limits on expressive activity "only tenuously connected" with the values underlying the
guarantee of freedom of speech. 127 Accordingly, section 281 was upheld.
R. v. Butler1 2 8

Butler was a video store operator criminally charged with obscenity under section
159 (now section 163) of the Criminal Code. 129 He challenged section 163 as a violation

123. Id. at para. 41.
124. Id. at paras. 44, 49, 52.
125. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, para. 65 (Can.).
126. Id. at para. 66 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 140.
128. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
129. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 163(8) (formerly § 159). Section 163 prohibits the
production, distribution or sale, or possession for the purposes of distribution or sale of any material "a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following
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of his freedom of speech. Professor MacKinnon led the LEAF committee that invoked
section 15 in defense of the obscenity provisions. The argument will be familiar to you:
pornography is a practice of sex discrimination - "a systematic practice of exploitation
and subordination based on sex that differentially harms" 1 30 individual women and
women as a group. The factum graphically describes the materials seized from Butler's
store as preface to explaining the continuing failings of the traditional, morality-based
test of obscenity focused on sexual explicitness. In Canadian law, the traditional
approach construed the core statutory definition of obscenity, "the undue exploitation of
sex," 13 1 as a breach of community standards of decency. This approach, LEAF argued,
obscured the harms of pornography to the status and treatment of women, because the
only harms recognized by the law were those to the morals of consumers and society
caused by pornography's indecent or disgusting content. By ignoring the exploitation
and degradation of women and the violence used in the making and use of pornography,
obscenity law "often implicitly functioned as an instrument to legitimize and enforce
women's disadvantaged status." 132The morality-based approach also led to
inconsistency in application of the law. 133
LEAF urged, as it had in Keegstra, a harms-based approach to obscenity focused
on the ways that pornography arises from and reinforces women's inequality. This more
constitutionally defensible approach was supported by recent Canadian obscenity case
law that understood the breach of community standards to reside in pornography's
degrading and dehumanizing depictions of women and human sexuality. LEAF noted
this approach is also supported by a significant body of legal and social science evidence
that exposes the production and distribution of pornography as a "systematic practice of
exploitation and subordination based on sex that differentially harms women" 134
contrary to section 15 of the Charter. In this approach, the harm warranting
criminalization is not indecency or distastefulness but "dehumanization, humiliation,
sexual exploitation, forced sex, forced prostitution, physical injury, child sexual abuse,
and sexual harassment." 1 35 In addition to such material harms, "[p]ornography also
"diminishes the reputation of women as a group, deprives women of their credibility and
social and self worth, and undermines women's equal access to protected rights."' 36
LEAF argued that some pornography is a violent form of expression that falls
outside the scope of the freedom of expression guarantee: "Direct physical violence to
real people is inflicted in order to make some pornography, particularly visual
pornography. Some women are coerced into pornography and sexually assaulted so that
pornography can be made of them." 1 37 Hence LEAF submitted that "where physical
subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, [which] shall be deemed to be obscene." Id
130. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd,475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
131. Canada Criminal Code § 163(8).
132. Factum of the Intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund para. 10, Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452,
available at http://www.leaf.ca/legal/facta/1992-butler.pdf#target. For a detailed elaboration of this argument,
see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Commentary, Not a MoralIssue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984).
133. Factum of the Intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, supranote 132, at para 14.
134. Id. at para. 22.
135. Id. at para. 23.
136. Id.
137. Id. at para. 30.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss1/10

20

McIntyre: Timely Interventions: MacKinnon's Contribution to Canadian Equali
2010

TIMELY INTER VENTIONS

101

harm becomes pornography, not only is the actual force or coercion outside the
protection of section 2(b), but so is the resulting pornography."l38 Likewise, LEAF
argued that section 2(b) should not be read to protect pornography that portrays explicit
sex and explicit violence, particularly rape, as pleasurable for the victim because social
science shows that exposure to such materials increases male aggression against women
and attitudes consistent with tolerance for violence against women. 139 LEAF also argued
that pornography which is inconsistent with women's section 15 and 28 equality rights
and serves none of the values underlying section 2(b), and so should fall outside of the
protection of the freedom of expression guarantee.1 40
As it did in Keegstra, the Court rejected both arguments for exempting violencebased, violence-promoting, or equality-eroding pornography from the protective reach of
section 2(b) and found an infringement of the accused's expression rights. It appeared
unpersuaded by or indifferent to research documenting the direct harms to women
coerced into making pornography and sexually abused in its production. However, the
Court upheld the law unanimously, rather than by Keegstra'sbare majority. In effect, the
Court adopted LEAF's approach, but in an analytically unsatisfactory way. First, it
rejected the traditional approach and held that outlawing obscenity in order to preserve
conventional moral values could not be constitutionally justified. The Court defined the
gravamen of the criminal offence to be the violence, degradation, and dehumanization it
markets. Hence, it found that the offence of obscenity is not sexual explicitness per se
but with the coupling of sex with violence, the depiction of explicit sex with children, or
depictions that degrade or dehumanize women and risk promoting their abuse. The Court
elaborated:
[D]egrading or dehumanizing materials place women (and sometimes men) in positions of
subordination, servile submission or humiliation. They run against the principles of
equality and dignity of all human beings. In the appreciation of whether material is
degrading or dehumanizing, the appearance of consent is not necessarily determinative ...
Sometimes the very appearance of consent makes the depicted acts even more degrading or
dehumanizingl41
So defined, the Court concluded that criminalization of obscenity was
constitutional to avoid harm to society, including the undermining of "other"
constitutional rights and the democratic values they preserve. 14 2 Citing with approval a
1978 government report on pornography, the Court characterized the harm to society as
follows:
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is that it reinforces some
unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society. The effect of this type of material is to reinforce

138. Facturn of the Intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund para. 30, Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452,
availableat http://www.leaf.callegal/facta/l1992-butler.pdf#target.
139. Id. at paras. 33-34.
140. Id. at paras. 35-55.
141. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, para. 51 (Can.). This passage suggests that the Court acknowledged
that "consent" to violation is simply a fictional trope of pornography conveyed by actors. It did not
acknowledge that images of violation captured factual violation of women coerced into pornography or filmed
in the process of being raped or otherwise sexually abused.

142. Id. at para. 94.
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male-female stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation,
humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships appear normal and
acceptable. A society which holds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and
mutuality are basic to any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justified in
controlling and prohibitin any medium of depiction, description or advocacy which
violates these principles.
The Court held that the objective of the law was to prevent harms to women and to
society's fundamental commitment to equality. It concluded that social science data
about the impacts of pornography, albeit conflicting, offered Parliament grounds for a
reasoned apprehension that materials depicting violence, cruelty, and dehumanization of
women desensitize consumers towards the degradation of women and may lead to
antisocial conduct that victimizes women.144 It rejected libertarian arguments favoring
restrictions on access to pornography over an outright ban on the basis that the social
harms to women and to sex equality continue no matter how hard the material is to
access. Finally, it held that the adverse effect of state curbs on expression that lies far
from the values underlying the right to freedom of expression is outweighed by
Parliament's objective. The Court's reasoning was explicitly grounded in equality
principle. The reasoning makes no reference to section 15, conveying that pornography
harms a social value, not a full-fledged constitutional right.
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme1 45
Seaboyer and Gayme were each charged with sexual assault under criminal laws
that had been reformed in 1983 to comply with section 15 to eliminate numerous
discriminatory provisions in the definition of several sexual crimes and in the evidentiary
rules that applied to their prosecution. 146 Among the reforms was a provision prohibiting
evidence of "general" sexual reputation and strictly limiting the admissibility of a
complainant's sexual history with men other than the accused. 147 Seaboyer and Gayme
challenged these provisions as infringements of their constitutional right to a fair trial.
LEAF intervened to defend the provisions as measures that did not erode an accused's
right to a fair trial but, rather, reduced the likelihood of acquittal by reason of
discriminatory rules premised on discriminatory stereotypes about women and women's
sexuality, rules rooted in and reinforcing of male dominance. The factum is a classic
MacKinnon-inspired exposition of male violence as a practice of sex discrimination and
of rape evidence rules as instances of perpetrator logic that legitimize male violence,
deter reporting, and compromise trial proceedings contrary to the Constitution. 148

143. Id. at para. 85 (citing STANDING COMM. ON JUSTICE & LEGAL AFFAIRS, Report on Pornography18:4
(1978)).
144. Id. at paras. 109-10, 112.
145. R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.). The Court joined the two cases because they
involved similar constitutional questions.
146. For the history of the reforms and critiques of their substance, see CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A
DECADE OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Julian V. Roberts & Renate M. Mohr eds., 1994).
147. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, §§ 276-277 (formerly §§ 246.6-246.7).
148. See Factum of the Intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund et al., Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R.
577, available at www.leaf.callegal/briefs/1992-seaboyer.html#target. For MacKinnon's own analysis of male
sexual violence as a practice of sex discrimination, see, for example, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
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Although LEAF's arguments inspired a memorable two-judge dissent, a sevenjudge majority of the Supreme Court held that in some cases denial of access to sexual
history evidence with third parties would infringe an accused's constitutional fair trial
rights.149 Despite granting LEAF leave to intervene to make section 15 arguments in the
appeal, the majority completely ignored the Constitution's equality guarantees when
adjudicating the accuseds' constitutional claim. 150 Ironically, this omission created a
legal opening for a national coalition of women to lobby the Federal Justice Department
to enact equality-driven amendments to sexual offence law that completely bypassed the
Seaboyer decision. The Seaboyer decision had effectively foreclosed reforms that created
any blanket prohibitions on the admissibility of any category of sexual history evidence
and required judges to have discretion to admit sexual history evidence unless its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact.151 Feminists,
particularly front-line rape crisis advocates, were, in any case, opposed to any such
reforms because their view was that a complainant's sexual history with the accused or
with other people - male or female - was never relevant to whether she had consented
to particular sexual activity with a particular individual on a particular occasion.
Insofar as specific evidentiary reforms categorically barring some sexual history
evidence had been constitutionally foreclosed, feminist activists adapted the substantive
equality analysis underlying LEAF's Seaboyer factum to press for a comprehensive
overhaul of sexual assault law that would finesse the specificity of the Seaboyer ruling.
The logic remained that rape is a practice of sex discrimination legitimated by
discriminatory rape myths indulged by and entrenched in law. The core strategy was to
codify definitions of consent and of non-consent so as to render reference to a
complainant's actual or imagined sexual history nonprobative to the determination of
whether she consented to the specific activity subject to prosecution.152 Common rape
myths about one, or some, or all women's propensity to consent to some or all sexual
activity and common rationalizations of male sexual aggression in the face of an absence
of consent to sexual activity, particularly the rationalizations dignified by the so-called
"mistake of fact" defence, were explicitly converted into mistakes of law which provide
no legal defence to sexual aggression. 153 In addition, the reforms narrowed the
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171-83 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE], and Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unequal Sex: A Sex Equality Approach to Sex Assault, in
WOMEN'S LIvES - MEN'S LAWS, supranote 84, at 240.
149. For critiques of the decision, see Diana Majury, Seaboyer and Gayme: A Study in Inequality, in
CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A DECADE OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 146, at 268; Martha
Shaffer, Seaboyer v. R: A Case Comment, 5 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 202, 211 (1992); Elizabeth A. Sheehy,
FeministArgumentation Before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme: The Sound of
One Hand Clapping, 18 MELB. U. L. REv. 450 (1991).
150. Section 15 was excluded from the otherwise comprehensive list of "Relevant Legislation" prefacing the
majority decision. See R. v. Seaboyer; R v. Gayme, 2 S.C.R. at paras. 15-18.
151. Id. at paras. 59-62.
152. For a detailed account of the feminist activism and legal strategy that achieved reforms effectively
bypassing Seaboyer, see Sheila McIntyre, Redefining Reformism: The Consultations That Shaped Bill C-49, in
CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A DECADE OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 146, at 293. See also
Submission of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund for Bill C-49, LEAF,
http://www.leaf.callegal/submissions/1992-billc49.pdf#target (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (submitted to
Parliament explaining and defending the reforms). This legislative brief was co-authored by Sheila McIntyre,
Elizabeth Shilton, and Christine Boyle.
153. The logic underlying this approach comes from Lucinda Vandervort, Mistake of Law and Sexual
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availability of the mistake of fact defence in the case of mistakes not premised on errors
of law about the meaning of consent. 154 The feminist lawyers and community activists
involved in the reforms also successfully lobbied for a statutory preamble characterizing
sexual assault as a gendered crime and identifying among the objectives of the law (for
purposes of constitutional justification) enforcement of women's constitutional rights to
fair trials, equality, and security of the person, as well as accuseds' rights to a fair
trial. 155 Finally, the reforms prohibited admission of sexual history evidence to support
an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity
charged or is less worthy of belief. Before admitting sexual history evidence for purposes
other than inferences based on these twin myths, judges are now statutorily required to
take into account eight factors, 156 including "the need to remove from the fact-finding
process any discriminatory belief or bias," 157 and to issue written reasons for their
admissibility or exclusion decisions. 15 8
The centerpiece of the reforms encapsulated in what Parliament tabled as Bill C-49
was a codification of a definition of consent and of circumstances in which no consent is
recognized. These codified definitions were inspired by the MacKinnon-Dworkin
pornography ordinance creating a civil remedy for the discriminatory harms of
pornography. 159 The ordinance defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination of women through pictures and/or words" that also includes one or more
of eight enumerated features drawn from the staples of pornography.160 These included,
for instance, women presented "dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities,"
"presented as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain," "presented as sexual objects
experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest, or other sexual assault," "presented in
postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display," and so on. 16 1 The
feminist lobby behind Bill C-49 likewise constructed the definitions of consent and the
enumerated list of circumstances in which no consent exists to foreclose reliance on the
most common rape myths and rationalizations deployed by accused men to raise a
reasonable doubt about whether the complainant did consent or about whether the
accused proceeded with sex without consent but with an "honestly mistaken" belief that
the sexual activity was consensual.
"Consent" was defined as "voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in

Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 233 (1987). The persistence of erroneous
characterization of mistakes of law as mistakes of fact is analyzed in her post-reform analysis, Lucinda
Vandervort, Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality and Mens Rea in
Sexual Assault, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625 (2004).
154. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 273.2.
155. The Preamble to the legislation is not incorporated into the text of the Criminal Code. It can be found in
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38 (Can.).
156. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 276(1), (3).
157. Id. at § 276(3)(d).
158. Id. at § 276.2(3)-(4).
159. For a summary of the analysis underpinning the Model Ordinance, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Civil
Rights Against Pornography,in WOMEN's LIVES - MEN'S LAWS, supra note 84, at 299. The complete text of
the Model Ordinance, including its definition of pomography, is in endnote 22 of the book. Id. at 493-97.
160. Id. at 494.
16 1. Id.
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the sexual activity in question."l 62 The idea is that consent is an action, something a
woman positively does, not something a sexual aggressor thinks or imagines or wishes;
and is an action she takes freely and consciously, not under coercion or while
unconscious due to intoxication, medication, or sleep. So defined, neither silence nor
failure to resist aggression amounts to consent. An accused who proceeds with sexual
activity until stopped or persuaded that "no" does mean "no" commits an assault. The
definition of consent remains gendered insofar as it implicitly assumes a male initiator
and a female responder,163 but at least it requires initiation to be communicated prior to
any sexual contact.
The legislation then defined non-consent to cover the most common self-serving
so-called mistakes about consent, including those premised on a complainant's actual or
imagined sexual history. It foreclosed reliance on the belief (by accused men, judges, or
juries) that "no" can mean "maybe" or "yes"; that unconscious women can consent (or
are fair game and asking for it); that consent to some form of sexualized contact equates
with consent to anything; that previous consent cannot be revoked at a later time; that
consent can be granted by a third party; and that consent can exist where induced by
abuse of power, authority, or trust.1 64 The mistake of fact defence was also restricted to
exclude mistakes caused by self-induced intoxication, willful blindness, or failure to take
"reasonable steps" to ascertain another's consent.16 5 Several elements of the new law
66
were challenged constitutionally, but none successfully.1
None of these reforms have rid sexual offence proceedings of discriminatory
substance or process. Indeed, a second wave of reforms was required to respond to the
defence bar's attempts to evade the post-Seaboyer reforms and their effective restriction
167
on the admissibility of sexual history evidence and of the mistake of fact defence.
168
Those reforms, as well, have only been modestly successful.
CONCLUSION

Catharine MacKinnon's critique of formal equality jurisprudence

and her

162. Canada Criminal Code § 273.1(1).
163. As MacKinnon has observed of most Anglo-American approaches to rape, "[c]onsent is supposed to be
women's form of control over intercourse, different from but equal to the custom of male initiative. Man
proposes, woman disposes. Even the ideal it is not mutual. Apart from the disparate consequences of refusal,
this model does not envision a situation the woman controls being placed in, or choices she frames."
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 148, at 174.
164. See Canada Criminal Code § 273.1(2). In my view, the abuse of power provision is the most important
of the non-consent clauses because it is capable of criminalizing not just abuse of formal official positions,
such as those occupied by, for example, probation, police, and customs officers, coaches, teachers, lawyers,
doctors, or priests, but abuses of social power.
165. Canada Criminal Code § 273.2(b).
166. See R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (Can.).
167. See supratext accompanying notes 59-70.
168. See Lise Gotell, The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential
Records: The Implications of the Charterfor Sexual Assault Law, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 251 (2002); Lise
Gotell, When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and the
Disclosure of Personal Records, 43 ALTA. L. REV. 743 (2006); Lise Gotell, Tracking Decisions on Access to
Sexual Assault Complainants' ConfidentialRecords: The Continued Permeabilityof Subsections 278.1-278.9
of the Criminal Code, 20 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 111 (2008).
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elaboration of inequality as a product of dominance, not difference, became available to
Canadian feminist equality activists at precisely the moment when the entrenchment of
Canada's new Charter of Rights and Freedoms mobilized Canadian feminist equality
advocates to participate proactively in defining the content of novel equality guarantees,
in establishing a coordinated litigation strategy for giving them meaning, and in
developing and broadly disseminating substantive equality approaches to specific
locations in law and life of women's inequality. MacKinnon's analyses, especially of
male sexual violence, have animated a substantial proportion of feminist legal
argumentation focused on the interpretation of section 15 and the respective
constitutional rights of men accused of sexual assault, the women who report the assault,
and the women affected by the outcomes of such litigation. Her work has also been a
significant influence in strategies to legislate reforms following litigation defeats.
The most directly influential of MacKinnon's contributions to Canadian
jurisprudence occurred as a result of her work on LEAF's National Legal Committee and
numerous specific case development subcommittees between 1987 and 1991. All of the
cases discussed in this article were theorized and argued at the Supreme Court of Canada
during this period. The twenty-plus years between 1987 and 1991 and the present
amount to a very long time in a constitutional jurisprudence as young as that rooted in a
Charter that was enacted only in 1982. Every one of the cases discussed in detail in this
article, as well as most of those used as illustrations of MacKinnon's broader influence
on feminist Charter litigation, is still taught in the major textbooks in every law school in
the country. With the exception of Seaboyer, where a MacKinnon-inspired equality
argument lost, all these precedents remain good law. And Seaboyer was effectively
overridden by MacKinnon-inspired, equality-driven legislated reform.
As well, MacKinnon's substantive and methodological approach to theorizing
systemic inequality problems remains the predominant approach among advocates
representing marginalized and oppressed groups (as, of course, formal equality remains
the approach of defenders of the unequal status quo). Her transformative impact on
Canadian equality scholars, scholarship, jurisprudence, and legislated law reforms
constitutes a remarkable legacy in a Canadian legal and political culture still in the early
days of defining what will become enduring constitutional norms. It bespeaks not only
the compelling intellectual, as well as legal power of her equality thinking, but a
generous collegiality within an international feminist community.
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